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Abstract
Acts of torture are conceptualized as crimes of obedience, which are inevitably 
linked to crimes at higher levels of the hierarchy, where orders are issued, policy is 
formulated, and the atmosphere conducive to acts of torture is created. The present 
analysis suggests several conditions under which torture becomes an instrument of 
State policy and the authority structure of the State is fully utilized to implement 
that policy: the perception by State authorities that the security of the State is 
under severe threat — which, at the macro-level, can justify torture and, at the 
micro-level,  contribute  to  its  authorization;  the  existence  of  an  elaborate  and 
powerful apparatus charged with protecting the security of the State — which, at 
the macro-level, may lead to the recruitment and training of professional torturers 
as part of that apparatus and, at the micro-level, contribute to the routinization of 
torture; and the existence of disaffected ethnic, religious, political, or other groups 
within (or under the control) of the State that do not enjoy full citizenship rights — 
which, at the macro-level, may lead to their designation as enemies of the State and 
appropriate targets for torture and, at the micro-level, their dehumanization.
: : : : : : :
*   This article is based on a paper presented at the conference on “War and peace: Social psychological 
approaches to armed conﬂicts and humanitarian issues” at the University of Geneva, 9-11 September 2004. 
It draws on the author’s chapter, “The social context of torture: Policy process and authority structure”, in 
Ronald D. Crelinsten & Alex P. Schmid (eds.), The Politics of Pain: Torturers and Their Masters, University 
of Leiden (COMT), Leiden, The Netherlands, 1993, pp. 21-38.H. C. Kelman – The policy context of torture
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The abuses of Iraqi prisoners by US soldiers at Abu Ghraib that came to light in 
the spring of 2004 have brought the issue of torture — particularly in the con-
text of armed conflict or in the fight against terrorism — again to the centre of 
the international agenda. It is quite legitimate to consider these events as part 
of an assessment of the Iraq war and of US policy in the region, but it would be 
a serious mistake to assume that torture is a peculiarly American phenomenon 
or that it can be adequately understood as a consequence of the special features 
of the Iraq war. Abu Ghraib is hardly the only or even the most extreme case of 
torture in the world. To the contrary, torture is widely practiced in many parts 
of the world; moreover, it is endemic to autocratic States and is far less prevalent 
in democratic ones. Abu Ghraib serves as a reminder, however, that even demo-
cratic States may resort to torture when a particular set of social conditions is 
in place. The purpose of this article is to explore the general social conditions 
conducive to torture, wherever it may occur. 
Central to my argument is the view that an adequate explanation of tor-
ture requires going beyond the characteristics of the individual perpetrators or 
even of the situations in which the torture is practiced, and focusing attention 
on the larger policy context in which the practice of torture is embedded. In 
the case of Abu Ghraib, for example, the findings of the investigative reporter, 
Seymour Hersh1 — the same man, incidentally, who broke the story of the My 
Lai massacre and its cover-up,2 which was the starting point of the work by 
Lee Hamilton and myself on crimes of obedience in the early 1970s3 — make 
it evident that the abuses were part of a systematic process. They took place in 
the context of interrogation and were apparently designed to “soften up” prison-
ers for questioning by intelligence officers. No doubt, some of the perpetrators 
engaged in these actions with a greater degree of initiative and sadistic enjoy-
ment than others, but they were operating in an atmosphere of pressure to pro-
duce intelligence information from prisoners presumed to be guilty. Whether 
or not some of the specific abuses and acts of torture were directly ordered, 
indications are that they were expected, condoned, and encouraged by higher 
officers. Commanding officers along the different tiers of the hierarchy have 
been accused, at the least, of exercising insufficient oversight of the conditions 
of detention and procedures of interrogation that prevailed in Abu Ghraib and 
other military prisons for suspected terrorists.
In the months following the exposure of the Abu Ghraib abuses, it has 
become increasingly evident that the treatment of the Abu Ghraib prisoners 
1   Seymour Hersh, “Torture at Abu Ghraib”, The New Yorker, Vol. 80, No. 11, 2004, pp. 42-47; Seymour 
Hersh, “Chain of command”, The New Yorker, Vol. 80, No. 12, 2004, p. 38-43.
2   See Seymour Hersh, My Lai 4: A Report on the Massacre and its Aftermath, Vintage Books, New York, 
1970; Seymour Hersh, Cover-up, Random House, New York, 1972.
3   Herbert C. Kelman and Lee H. Lawrence [V. Lee Hamilton], “Assignment of responsibility in the case of 
Lt. Calley: Preliminary report on a national survey”, Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1972, pp. 177-
212; Herbert C. Kelman and V. Lee Hamilton, “Availability for violence: A study of U.S. public reactions 
to the trial of Lt. Calley” in: Joseph D. Ben-Dak (ed.), The Future of Collective Violence: Societal and 
International Perspectives, Studentlitteratur, Lund, Sweden, 1974, pp. 125-142.Volume 87 Number 857 March 2005 
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was  not  an  isolated  occurrence,  nor  was  it  simply  the  product  of  decisions 
and actions (or inaction) at the local level. Similar patterns of abuse, linked 
to aggressive interrogation techniques, occurred in prisons elsewhere in Iraq, 
and — going back to 2002 — in Afghanistan and Guantánamo Bay. Numerous 
documents show that the techniques and practices revealed in Abu Ghraib had 
“migrated” from Guantánamo and Afghanistan and that they were authorized 
or justified at various points by high-ranking officials in the Pentagon and the 
White House.4 For example, memos circulating in upper echelons of the admin-
istration authorized harsh interrogation techniques; deﬁned torture so narrowly 
that many forms of painful, debilitating, and degrading treatment became per-
missible; and suggested that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to “unlawful 
combatants.”5 The mistreatment of prisoners revealed by the various reports, 
particularly given the context in which it occurred, has all the earmarks of 
physical  and  mental  torture.  And,  indeed,  the  accounts  presented  in  these 
reports are highly reminiscent of what is known about the conditions that have 
given rise to torture so often in the past anywhere in the world.
The crime of torture
Despite the fact that torture is a crime under the UN Convention against Torture, 
adopted by the General Assembly in 1984,6 and other relevant international 
frameworks, and is similarly defined in the national legal codes of many of the 
UN’s member States, it is a practice that is widespread throughout the world. 
Some instances of torture constitute “ordinary” crimes, i.e., crimes committed 
in violation of the expectations and instructions of authority. Torture would be 
an ordinary crime in this sense if it were carried out by individual officials at 
their own initiative and in disregard of the policies and orders under which they 
function. Similarly, officials could be charged with torture as an ordinary crime 
if they used means of pressure in excess of what was legally permitted.
The essential phenomenon of torture, however, is that it is not an ordi-
nary crime, but a crime of obedience: a crime that takes place, not in opposi-
tion to the authorities, but under explicit instructions from the authorities to 
4   For relevant documentation, see Mark Danner, Torture and Truth: America, Abu Ghraib, and the War on 
Terror, New York Review Books, New York, 2004; and Steven Strasser, The Abu Ghraib Investigations: The 
Oﬃcial Independent Panel and Pentagon Reports on the Shocking Prisoner Abuse in Iraq, PublicAﬀairs, 
New York, 2004.
5   The most recent disclosures were in documents obtained and released by the American Civil Liberties 
Union, including FBI reports that describe severe abuses of prisoners and highly coercive methods of 
interrogation, going back to Guantánamo Bay in 2002. Some of the FBI agents submitting these ﬁeld 
reports  expressed  the  belief  that  the  tactics  they  observed  (and  considered  both  objectionable  and 
unproductive) had high-level approval, coming from the Pentagon and/or the White House. Cf. Kate 
Zernike, “Newly released reports show early concern on prison abuse”, New York Times, 6 January 2005, 
pp. A1 and A18.
6   J. Herman Burgers and Hans Danelius, The United Nations Convention against Torture: A Handbook 
on the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
Martinus Nijhoﬀ Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1988, pp. 177-8.H. C. Kelman – The policy context of torture
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engage in acts of torture, or in an environment in which such acts are implicitly 
sponsored, expected or at least tolerated by the authorities. Lee Hamilton and 
I have defined a crime of obedience as “an act performed in response to orders 
from authority that is considered illegal or immoral by the larger community.”7 
Torture is clearly considered illegal and immoral by the international commu-
nity; it is prohibited by international declarations and conventions that have 
been unanimously adopted by member States of the United Nations. Yet it is 
the authorities of these very States that order, encourage or tolerate systematic 
policies or sporadic acts of torture.
When does an ordinary crime become a crime of obedience? It is often 
the case — in acts of torture as much as in other gross violations of human 
rights — that the perpetrators engage in the action willingly, enthusiastically 
and with varying degrees of innovation. But “the fact that a criminal action 
serves various personal motives or is carried out with a high degree of initiative 
and personal involvement does not necessarily remove it from the category of 
crimes of obedience,”8 as long as the action is supported by the authority struc-
ture: as long as the perpetrators believe and have good reason to believe that the 
action is authorized, expected, at least tolerated, and probably approved by the 
authorities – that it conforms with official policy and reflects what their superi-
ors would want them to do.
Recognizing torture as a crime of obedience immediately directs our 
attention to the other side of the coin: to the crimes of authority that invari-
ably accompany crimes of obedience. For every subordinate who performs acts 
of torture under official orders or with the encouragement or toleration of the 
authorities, there is a superior — or typically an entire hierarchy of superiors 
— who issue the orders and who formulate the policies that require or permit 
these acts of torture. Higher-level superiors may in fact not have issued specific 
orders to engage in torture, but they are the ones who formulate the policies, 
create the atmosphere and establish the framework within which officials at 
intermediate levels of the hierarchy translate general policy directives into spe-
cific acts of torture.
The fact that crimes of obedience take place within a hierarchical struc-
ture makes it especially difficult to pinpoint responsibility for them. The ques-
tion, however, is not “who is responsible?” — the actual perpetrator or the 
authority — but “who is responsible for what?” When the question is framed 
that way, it becomes clear that both ought to be held responsible.
The torturers themselves are properly held responsible for the actions 
they perform and the harm they cause, even if they are acting under superior 
orders. Since the adoption of the Nuremberg Principles after World War II, which 
have been incorporated into the military codes of all Western States, superior 
orders cannot be used as an absolute defence for criminal actions on the part 
7   Herbert C. Kelman and V. Lee Hamilton, Crimes of Obedience: Toward a Social Psychology of Authority 
and Responsibility, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1989, p. 46.
8   Ibid., p. 50.Volume 87 Number 857 March 2005 
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of subordinates. The UN Convention against Torture specifically applies this 
principle to torturers when it states that: “An order from a superior officer or a 
public authority may not be invoked as a justification of torture.”9 Subordinates 
have the obligation to evaluate the legality of orders and to disobey those orders 
that they know or should have known to be illegal.
Superiors,  for  their  part,  have  the  obligation  to  consider  the  conse-
quences of the policies they set and to oversee the ways in which those policies 
are translated into specific orders and actions as they move down the ladder. 
The authorities’ obligation of oversight makes the defence of ignorance of or 
lack of control over the actions of subordinates generally unacceptable, since 
they are expected to know and to control what their subordinates are doing. Of 
course, more often than not, torture does not result from negligence at the top, 
but from deliberate policy — or perhaps deliberate inattention at the top to the 
way in which policy is carried out below.
The policy context of torture
Conceptualizing torture as a crime of obedience implies that it must be under-
stood in the context of the policy process that gives rise to it and of the author-
ity structure within which this policy is carried out. I thus look to the policy 
process and the authority structure to identify the major determinants of acts of 
torture as well as the major correctives against these practices. In doing so, I do 
not minimize the role of individual and cultural differences.
With respect to individual differences, I am sure there is a certain degree 
of self-selection of individuals who gravitate to the role of torturer. Moreover, 
those operating within the role vary in the amount of enthusiasm, diligence and 
innovativeness that they bring to the task. Differences in personality and back-
ground doubtless play an important part in determining who becomes a tor-
turer and who acts out that role eagerly and with evident enjoyment. But a focus 
on structural factors helps us understand why many, perhaps most, torturers are 
not sadists but ordinary people, doing what they understand to be their jobs. 
I might add that individual differences in readiness to engage in torture may 
be related as much to people’s orientation toward authority as they are to their 
propensity toward aggression or their sense of compassion.10 
Cultural diﬀerences, particularly diﬀerences in political culture, certainly 
also play an important role. Thus, Berto Jongman11 shows that human rights viola-
tions, including torture, are much more likely to occur in non-democratic than in 
democratic societies, and in countries at low levels rather than high levels of devel-
opment. Democratic countries are less likely to practice torture precisely because 
of the nature of their policy process and authority structure. But torture does occur 
9   Burgers and Danelius, op. cit. (note 6), p. 178.
10   See Kelman and Hamilton, 1989, op. cit. (note 7), chs. 11 and 12.
11   Berto Jongman, “Why some States kill and torture while others do not”, PIOOM Newsletter, 1991, Vol. 3, 
No. 1, pp. 8-11.H. C. Kelman – The policy context of torture
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even in highly developed democratic societies, usually in the context of counter-
terrorist activities or armed conﬂict, as the experiences of Guantánamo Bay and 
Abu Ghraib well illustrate. There are social conditions under which democratic 
cultures that ordinarily respect human rights may sanction torture, just as there 
are social conditions under which ordinary, decent individuals may be induced 
to take part in it. Thus, while individual and cultural factors are important deter-
minants of torture, they operate in interaction with the policy process and the 
authority structure that ultimately give rise to the practice.
The use of torture as an instrument of policy
Torture has been practiced by non-State entities or agents, such as guerrilla 
groups or liberation movements, but it is primarily a phenomenon linked to 
the State. The emergence or reemergence of torture as an instrument of policy 
in the twentieth century is directly related to the nature of the modern State. 
In particular, as Edward Peters12 argues in his historical study, torture arises 
from the combination of two features of the modern State: its vast power and 
its enormous vulnerability to State enemies, internal and external. The power of 
the modern State rests in the extent to which it affects all aspects of the life of 
its citizens and the resources that it can mobilize to control its population. The   
vulnerability of the modern State stems from the high degree of interdepen-
dence of the political, economic, and social institutions required to run a modern 
society and the resulting ease with which social order can disintegrate and the 
political authorities can lose control when their legitimacy declines in the eyes 
of their population, or when they confront terrorism and insurgency.
The conditions conducive to the rise of torture as an instrument of State 
policy are the authorities’ perception of an active threat to the security of the 
State from internal and external sources; the availability of a security apparatus, 
which enables the authorities to use the vast power at their disposal to counter 
that threat by repressive means; and the presence within the society of groups 
defined as enemies of or potential threats to the State (see adjoining table). 
The Policy Context of Torture
CONDITIONS CONDUCIVE TO   SOCIAL PROCESSES FACILITATING TORTURE
THE USE OF TORTURE AS AN
INSTRUMENT OF POLICY  At Level of Policy Formation  At Level of Implementation
Perception of a Security Threat  Justiﬁcation of a policy of torture   Authorization of acts of torture
Existence of a Security Apparatus
  Development of professional  
Routinization of torture practices
    torture cadres 
Presence of Groups Deﬁned   Exclusion of target groups from   Dehumanization of targets of 
as Enemies of the State   protection of the State  torture
12   Edward Peters, Torture, Basil Blackwell, New York and London, 1985.Volume 87 Number 857 March 2005 
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The recourse to repression is particularly likely in situations in which opposi-
tion represents a challenge to the legitimacy of those in power and thus a fun-
damental threat to their continued ability to maintain power, such as States in 
which the rulers’ legitimacy rests on a unitary, unchangeable ideology (political 
or religious), or States run by a ruling clique with an extremely narrow popula-
tion base (in socio-economic and/or ethnic terms) but with the support of mili-
tary forces. However, torture may also be used, sporadically or sometimes sys-
tematically, by democratic regimes that find themselves in charge of ethnically 
distinct populations or subpopulations that do not accept their rule — such as 
Israel in the occupied territories or Britain in Northern Ireland.
When State authorities resort to torture, they can often point to a his-
tory of violence directed against the State: in the form of insurgency, guerrilla 
operations, or terrorist acts. To be sure, torture may at times be applied to indi-
viduals whose only crime is political or religious dissent, or even mere member-
ship in a religious or ethnic community that does not fit into the ruling group’s 
scheme of things. Still, the occurrence or perceived threat of violence against 
the State is central to the rationale for a policy of torture.13
Given the centrality of the threat of violence in the rationale for a policy 
of torture in modern times, it is not surprising that torture is particularly likely 
to occur in the context of war or armed conﬂict. Although my analysis so far 
has focused on torture within the State, aimed at repressing domestic groups or   
populations whom the authorities perceive as internal threats to the security of   
the State or as agents and allies of external enemies of the State, it is equally appli-
cable to situations of war and occupation, in which torture may be used against 
members or suspected supporters of the enemy camp. The use of torture in war   
situations — often directed at civilians, as well as at military personnel — has   
become more probable as war has moved from the classical clash between orga-
nized armed forces to a clash between whole populations, in which civilian groups 
are often speciﬁcally targeted.14 Torture in this context may be used as part of State 
policy of control and repression of the population and as an instrument of inter-
rogation or psychological warfare. The conditions conducive to the use of torture 
in situations of armed conﬂict are identical to those outlined in the table. Once 
again, democratic regimes are not immune to the use of torture under these con-
ditions, as the US actions in Afghanistan and Iraq so clearly illustrate.
Social processes facilitating a policy of torture
At the level of policy formation, there are three important points at which the 
perceived threat to the security of the State provides the rationale for a policy of 
13   Wolfgang S. Heinz, “The military, torture and human rights: Experiences from Argentina, Brazil, Chile 
and Uruguay”, in Ronald D. Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid (eds.), The Politics of Pain: Torturers and their 
Masters, COMT, University of Leiden, Leiden, The Netherlands, 1993, pp. 73-108.
14   Martin Shaw, War and Genocide: Organized Killing in Modern Society, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 2003.H. C. Kelman – The policy context of torture
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torture and the power of the State enables it to implement that policy: in establish-
ing the purpose and justiﬁcation of the torture; in recruiting the agents or perpe-
trators of the torture; and in deﬁning the targets of the torture (see table).
First, the essential justification of torture, as has already been proposed, 
is the protection of the State against internal and external threats to its secur-
ity — which often means the maintenance in power of those more or less nar-
row elements of the population that have gained control of the State apparatus. 
The practice of torture is justified by reference to the particular doctrine of the 
State’s legitimization: maintaining law and order or stability, or the rule of “the 
people” whom the State claims to embody, or the rule of God, or the survival 
of Western civilization, or the integrity of national institutions. In war situa-
tions, of course, the justification for taking up arms, generally couched in terms 
of defence against threats to national security and to the vital interests of the 
State, also covers whatever steps are deemed necessary — including torture — to 
achieve the military objectives. 
Second, the agents of torture are defined as a professional force with a 
significant role in protecting the State against internal threats to its security. The 
power of the State allows it to mobilize the necessary resources to establish a tor-
ture apparatus. A central component of that mobilization process is the recruit-
ment of a cadre of torture practitioners through the development of what is in 
effect an organized profession — a profession that is wholly owned by the State, 
operates within the State’s internal security framework and is dedicated to the 
service and protection of the State. Like other professionals, torturers undergo 
a rigorous process of professional training, socialization and indoctrination to 
prepare them for their roles.15 Typically, this process includes torture resistance 
training, which acclimatizes them to cruelty.16 (In war situations, it might be 
noted here, acclimatization to violence and cruelty is a daily occurrence, requir-
ing no specialized training.) Another element of the professionalization of tor-
ture is that it has become an international enterprise. Torturers from different 
parts of the world come together in international meetings at which they share 
information about training procedures and torture techniques.
Third, the targets of torture are defined as enemies of the State who 
constitute serious threats to the State’s security and survival. For that, as well as 
for other reasons, such as their ethnicity or ideology, they are placed outside the 
protection of the State. In the modern State, individual rights in effect derive 
from the State. Thus, to be excluded from the State — to be denied the rights of 
citizenship — is tantamount to becoming a non-person vulnerable to arbitrary 
treatment, to torture, and ultimately to extermination. Targets of torture in the 
15   H. Radtke, “Torture as an illegal means of control”, in Franz Bockle and Jacques Pohier (eds.), The Death 
Penalty and Torture, Seabury Press, New York, 1979, pp. 3-15; Janice T. Gibson, “Factors contributing 
to the creation of a torturer”, in Peter Suedfeld (ed.), Psychology and Torture, Hemisphere Publishing 
Corporation, New York, 1990, pp. 77-88.
16   Radtke, op. cit. (note 15); see also Ronald D. Crelinsten, “In their own words: The world of the torturer”, in 
Ronald D. Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid (eds.), The Politics of Pain: Torturers and their Masters. COMT, 
University of Leiden, Leiden, The Netherlands, 1993, pp. 39-72.Volume 87 Number 857 March 2005 
131
context of armed conflict are, by definition, placed in the category of enemies, 
who are not entitled to the protection of the State. In principle, enemy combat-
ants and civilian populations are protected against torture and other violations 
of their human rights by the Geneva Conventions.17 In practice, people catego-
rized as enemies in a war situation are vulnerable to being targeted for torture.
Social processes facilitating participation in torture
The three points at which the security concerns and power of the State contrib-
ute to a policy of torture at the macro-level — i.e., the justification for torture, 
the agents of torture, and the targets of torture — can be linked to three social 
processes that facilitate participation in torture at the micro-level: the processes 
of authorization, routinization and dehumanization, which I distinguished in 
my earlier analysis of sanctioned massacres and other crimes of obedience.18 
The justification of torture as a means of protecting the State against threats to 
its security helps to authorize the practice; the development of a profession of 
torturers as part of the State’s security apparatus helps to routinize the admin-
istration of torture; and the designation of the targets of torture as enemies of 
the State who are excluded from the State’s protection helps to dehumanize the 
victims (see table, right-hand column). These three social processes contribute 
to weakening the moral restraints against engaging in torture and other gross 
violations of human rights: authorization absolves individuals of the responsi-
bility to make personal moral choices on the basis of standard moral principles; 
routinization enables them to ignore the overall meaning of the tasks they are 
performing and eliminates the opportunity to raise moral questions; dehumani-
zation excludes the victims from the perpetrators’ moral community, making it 
unnecessary to relate to them in moral terms. These three processes are medi-
ated to a significant degree by the torturers’ relationship to the State.
The role of authorization is strengthened by the fact that torturers, 
typically, are not just acting within a hierarchy in which they are expected to 
obey — and have indeed been trained to obey without question19 — but are par-
ticipating in an action that represents a transcendent mission. They have come to 
share the view of the authorities that the task they are engaged in serves a high 
purpose that transcends any moral scruples they might bring to the situation. 
They have come to see themselves as playing an important part in an effort to 
protect the State: to ensure its security and continued integrity, to maintain law 
and order, or to keep alive the fundamental values of the State that are being sub-
jected to a merciless onslaught by ruthless enemies who are intent on destroying 
17   Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949; Geneva Convention 
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949.
18   Herbert C. Kelman, “Violence without moral restraints: Reﬂections on the dehumanization of victims 
and victimizers”, Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 29, No. 4, 1973, pp. 25-61; Kelman and Hamilton, 1989, op. 
cit. (note 7).
19   Gibson, op. cit. (note 15).H. C. Kelman – The policy context of torture
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it. This view of the purpose of the proposed torture as part of a noble effort, in 
which the perpetrators are prepared to play their role despite any moral reserva-
tions and feelings of repugnance they might have, greatly enhances the legiti-
macy of the enterprise.
An additional element of the torture situation that contributes to its 
perceived legitimacy is the participation of medical professionals, who often 
play an active role by evaluating victims’ physical capacity to go through the 
process, by making sure that the torture does not go beyond the point of causing 
the victim to die, and by performing other functions.20 Incidentally, the role of 
physicians in interrogations that are tantamount to torture has also been noted 
in connection with Abu Ghraib.21 The justification of torture as a necessary 
means of ferreting out “the truth” also helps to surround it with an aura of legiti-
macy, as does the legal context in which it often takes place. One of the common 
uses of torture is as an adjunct to judicial proceedings, where it is designed to 
obtain evidence to be introduced into trials. This practice goes back to the early 
uses of torture — in the Roman period and in the Middle Ages — as a central 
part of the process of producing a confession, which was deemed necessary to 
establish the guilt of the accused.22
The routinization of torture is enhanced by the establishment of tortur-
ers as a professional group, which contributes to normalizing and ennobling 
their work. Torturers come to see themselves as performing a job, as doing their 
duty. It is a job that often involves hard work, that can lead to promotion and 
other rewards, that may offer opportunities to demonstrate innovativeness, that 
one can excel in and become expert at. Above all, it is a job that one can be 
proud of, because it provides a significant service to the State and often carries 
with it membership in an elite corps.
The torture process itself also shows signs of considerable routinization. 
It usually involves a series of steps, clearly identified and following each other 
in regular sequence. The different torture techniques, as well as the different 
torture chambers, are typically designated by special names, often with a euphe-
mistic or ironic quality. These names are not so much designed to hide the real-
ity of what is actually taking place as to give expression to a professional culture 
with its own rituals and language.23 The procedures used by torture organiza-
tions — including a variety of psychological techniques – are often quite sophis-
ticated. All of this helps to give the work an aura of professionalism, which 
allows the torturer to perceive it not as an act of cruelty against another human 
being, but as the routine application of specialized knowledge and skills.
20   Stephen  V.  Faraone,  “Psychology’s  role  in  the  campaign  to  abolish  torture:  Can  individuals  and 
organizations make a diﬀerence?”, in Peter Suedfeld (ed.), Psychology and Torture, Hemisphere Publishing 
Corporation, New York, 1990, pp. 185-193. See also Jean Maria Arrigo, “A utilitarian argument against 
torture interrogation of terrorists”, Science and Engineering Ethics, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2004, pp. 543-572. 
21   See, for example, M. Gregg Bloche and Jonathan H. Marks, “When doctors go to war”, The New England 
Journal of Medicine, Vol. 29, No. 1, 6 January 2005, pp. 3-6.
22   Peters, op. cit. (note 12).
23   Radtke, op. cit. (note 15). Volume 87 Number 857 March 2005 
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In dehumanization, too, the State is an important part of the equation, 
going back, in fact, to the early history of torture. In the Roman legal system, 
torture — as a means of obtaining confessions — was originally applied only 
to slaves and foreigners, but not to citizens.24 In contemporary practice torture 
victims are, or are treated as, non-citizens. The main source of their dehumani-
zation is their designation as enemies of the State, who have placed themselves 
outside the moral community shared by the rest of the population. They are 
described as terrorists, insurgents or dissidents who endanger the State and are 
bent on undermining law and order and destroying the community. The view 
of torture victims as non-citizens who are not entitled to the protection of the 
State was evident in interviews that Heinz25 conducted with “masters of tor-
ture” in Latin America: once they identified guerrillas as Communists, they saw 
them as foreign agents and thus, in effect, as “denaturalized.” Furthermore, tor-
ture increased when guerrillas began killing military officers and their families, 
because they came to be seen not only as outsiders who are not entitled to the 
community’s protection, but also as dangerous elements against whom the com-
munity had a right to protect itself.
A central assumption in the contemporary practice of torture — just 
as in the early days, when it was used as a systematic part of criminal legal 
procedures — is that the victims are guilty. The torture apparatus operates on 
the assumption that those who are brought in for torture are guerrillas, insur-
gents or terrorists who have committed and/or are about to commit dangerous 
crimes against the State. Thus, torture is designed only to punish the guilty, 
to warn their accomplices and, most important, to elicit the truth from them. 
Indeed, torture is often justified on the grounds that it is the only way to elicit 
information necessary for the protection of the State and its citizens — such as 
information about the identity and whereabouts of terrorist leaders or about 
planned terrorist operations — that the torture victims are presumed to have in 
their possession.
A contributing factor to the dehumanization of torture victims is the fact 
that, even when they are citizens of the State that tortures them, they often do 
not belong to the ethnic or religious community of the torturers and the domi-
nant segment of society. This has been the case for Kurds in Iraq, for Bahais in 
Iran, for Palestinians in Kuwait and in the Israeli-occupied territories, for Irish 
Catholics in Northern Ireland or for Bosnian Muslims in the former Yugoslavia, 
to mention only a few. In many cases the victims’ ethnic or religious identity is 
itself the primary reason for their vulnerability to torture. In other cases, ethnic 
or religious identity is a factor in dissent or insurgency. In all cases, it facilitates 
exclusion and dehumanization, thus removing one of the constraints against 
torture and other serious violations of human rights.
24   Peters, op. cit. (note 12).
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Conclusion
The conditions conducive to the use of torture are endemic to the autocratic 
security State. Part of the answer to torture thus clearly points in the direction 
of democratization: torture is much less likely to take place in States governed 
with the consent of the governed and accountable for their policies and actions. 
However, even Western democratic societies are not invulnerable to the condi-
tions that tempt State authorities to adopt torture as a policy instrument and 
enable them to implement a policy of torture: the perception of fundamental 
threats to the security and integrity of the State; the existence of bureaucratic 
organizations charged with ensuring State security, staffed by professionally 
trained security specialists and allowed to operate with greater secrecy and less 
accountability than is customary in democratic societies; and the presence of 
foreign, poorly integrated or non-citizen elements within the population that 
can easily be seen as outside the contract that obligates citizens and State to 
one another in a democratic polity. The said conditions are particularly likely 
to arise in the context of armed conflict — whether civil or international — in 
which the threat to the State is readily personified in an internal or external 
enemy bent on violence and destruction; when combined, they can override the 
constraints and bypass the scrutiny, imposed by democratic values and institu-
tions, that usually stand in the way of gross violations of human rights in demo-
cratic societies. These, then, are the conditions that must be addressed, wher-
ever they manifest themselves, as we struggle against the practice of torture and 
develop approaches to bring about its worldwide abolition.